

BOREAS RISING:

WHITE NATIONALISM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE

PARIS-BERLIN-MOSCOW AXIS

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"History is again on the move."

-Arnold Toynbee

For a half century, we nationalists stood with the "West" in its struggle against the Asiatic Marxism of the Soviet bloc. There was little problem then distinguishing between our friends and our foes, for all evil was situated in the collectivist East and all virtue in the liberal West. Today, things are much less clear. Not only has the Second American War on Iraq revealed a profound geopolitical divide within the West, the social-political order associated with it now subverts our patrimony in ways no apparatchik ever imagined. Indeed, it seems hardly exaggerated to claim that Western elites (those who Samuel Huntington calls the "dead souls")¹ have come to pose the single greatest threat to our people's existence.

For some, this threat was discovered only after 1989. Yet as early as the late forties, a handful of white nationalists, mainly in Europe, but with the American Francis Parker Yockey at their head, realized that Washington's postwar order, not the Soviet Union, represented the greater danger to the white biosphere.² Over the years, particularly since the fall of Communism, this realization has spread, so that a large part of Europe's nationalist vanguard no longer supports the West, only Europe, and considers the West's leader its chief enemy.³

For these nationalists, the United States is a kind of anti-Europe, hostile not only to its motherland, but to its own white population. The Managerial Revolution of the thirties, Jewish influence in the media and the academy, the rise of the national security state and the military-industrial complex have all had a hand in fostering this anti-Europeanism, but for our transatlantic cousins its roots reach back to the start of our national epic. America's Calvinist settlers, they point out, saw themselves as latter-day Israelites, who fled Egypt (Europe) for the Promised Land. Their shining city on the hill, founded on Old Testament, not Old World, antecedents, was to serve as a beacon to the rest of humanity. America began – and thus became itself – by casting off its European heritage. The result was a belief that America was

a virtuous land, dedicated to liberty and equality, while Europe was mired in vice, corruption, and tyranny. Then, in the eighteenth century, this anti-Europeanism took political form, as the generation of 1776 fashioned a new state based on Lockean/Enlightenment principles, which were grafted onto the earlier Calvinist ones. As these liberal modernist principles came to fruition in the twentieth century, once the Christian, Classical vestiges of the country's "Anglo-Protestant core" were shed, they helped legitimate the missionary cosmopolitanism of its corporate, one-world elites, and, worse, those extracultural, anti-organic, and hedonistic influences hostile to the European soul of the country's white population.⁴

This European nationalist view of our origins ought to trouble white nationalists committed to preserving America's European character, for, however slanted, it contains a not insignificant kernel of truth. My intent here is not to revisit this interpretation of our history, but to look at a development that puts it in a different racial perspective. So as not to wander too far afield, let me simply posit (rather than prove) that the de-Europeanizing forces assailing America's white population are only superficially rooted in the Puritan heritage. The Low Church fanatics who abandoned their English motherland and inclined America to a biblical enterprise, despite their intent, could not escape their racial nature, which influenced virtually every facet of early American life. Indeed, the paradox of America is that it began not simply as a rejection but also as a projection of Europe. Thus, beyond their ambivalent relationship to Europe, Americans (until relatively recently) never had any doubt that their race and High Culture were European. As such, they showed all the defining characteristics of the white race, taming the North American continent with little more than rifles slung across their backs, and doing so in the European spirit of self-help, self-reliance, and fearlessness. As Yockey writes: "America belongs spiritually, and will always belong to the [European] civilization of which it is a colonial transplantation, and no part of the true America belongs to the primitivity of the barbarians and fellaheen outside of this civilization."⁵

As long, then, as Americans were of Anglo-Celtic (or European) stock, with racially conscious standards, their Calvinist or liberal ideology remained of secondary importance. Our present malaise, I would argue, stems less from these ideological influences (however retarding) than from a more recent development — the Second World War — whose world-transforming effects were responsible for distorting and inverting our already tenuous relationship to Europe. For once our motherland was conquered and occupied (what the apologists of the present regime ironically refer to as its "liberation") and once the new postwar system of transnational capital was put in place, a New Class of powers with a vested interest in de-Europeanizing America's white population was allowed to assume command of American life. The result is the present multiracial system,

whose inversion of the natural order negates the primacy of our origins and promises our extinction as a race and a culture. The only possibility of escaping its annihilating fate would seem, then, to be another revolutionary transformation of the world order — one that would throw the existing order into crisis and pose an alternative model of white existence. The “Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis” formed during the recent Iraq war, I believe, holds out such a possibility.

GENESIS OF AN AXIS

As part of its *Mobiles Géopolitique* series, the Franco-Swiss publisher L'Age d'Homme announced in April 2002 the release of *Paris-Berlin-Moscou: La voie de l'indépendance et de la paix* (Paris-Berlin-Moscow: The Way of Peace and Independence). Authored by Henri de Grossouvre, the youngest son of a prominent Socialist party politician, and prefaced by General Pierre Marie Gallois, France's premier geostrategic thinker, *Paris-Berlin-Moscou* argued that Europe would never regain its sovereignty unless it threw off American suzerainty and did so in alliance with Russia.

In recommending a strategic alliance between France, Germany, and Russia for the sake of a Eurasian federation stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Grossouvre's thesis seemed entirely utopian. For although the prospect of such an alliance had long animated the imagination of revolutionary nationalists, it seemed more fantasy than possibility, even when proposed by a well-connected and reputable member of the governing elites. Fantasy, however, rather unexpectedly took hold of the international arena. Within months of the book's publication, its thesis assumed a life of its own, as the new Likudized administration in Washington started beating the drums for another war on Iraq.

The axis and the war it sought to avoid will be looked at in the following sections. Here, a few words on Grossouvre's book are in order, for, besides being one of those novel cases where life seemed to imitate art, it stirred the European public, was extensively reviewed, led to the organization of several international conferences attended by diplomats, military leaders, and parliamentarians, and culminated in a website with over two thousand pages of documentation.⁶ Its effect on the European — especially on the anti-liberal — spirit has been profound. If the axis it proposes is stabilized as an enduring feature of the international order (and much favors that), a realignment as significant as 1945 could follow.

Paris-Berlin-Moscou begins by acknowledging the common values linking America and Europe, the so-called Atlantic community, as well as the U.S. role in guaranteeing European security during the Cold War. On both these counts, the author's establishment ties are evident, for no anti-liberal views the Atlantic relationship in quite such uncritical terms. Nevertheless, in arguing that these two factors no longer justify Europe's dependence on

the United States, he breaks with the prevailing system (or at least what *was* the prevailing system) of strategic thought.

In Grossouvre's view, Europe's geopolitical relationship to the United States was fundamentally altered between 1989 and 1991, when Eastern Europe threw off its Soviet yoke, Germany reunified, and Russia called off the Communist experiment begun in 1917. Then, as Europe's strategic dependence on the United States came to an end, so too did its heteronomy.⁷ Moreover, it is only a matter of time, Grossouvre predicts, before Russia recovers, China develops, and U.S. power is again challenged. In the meantime, U.S. efforts to perpetuate its supremacy, defend its neo-liberal system of global market relations, and stifle potential threats to its dominance are transforming it into a force of international instability. But even if this were not the case, Grossouvre contends that Europeans would still need to separate themselves from America's New World Order (NWO), for their independence as a people is neither a luxury nor a vanity, but requisite to their survival.⁸ For as Carl Schmitt contends, it is only in politically asserting itself that a people truly exists – conscious of its place in history, oriented to the future, and secure in its identity.⁹

Europe's ascent – and here Grossouvre most distinguishes himself from the reigning consensus – will owe little to the European Union (EU). Although its GNP is now approaching that of the U.S.; its share of world imports and exports is larger; its manufacturing capacity and productivity are greater; its population is larger, more skilled, and better educated; its currency, the euro, sounder; and its indebtedness qualitatively lower, the EU does not serve Europe in any civilizational sense.¹⁰ Its huge unwieldy bureaucracy serves only Mammon, which means it lacks a meaningful political identity and hence the means to play an international role commensurate with its immense economic power. It indeed caricatures the "European idea," representing a technocratic economism without roots and without memory, focused on market exchanges and financial orthodoxies that are closer in spirit to America's neo-liberal model than to anything native to Europe's own tradition. (As one French rightist argues, "Every time the technocrats in Brussels speak, they profane the idea of Europe.")¹¹ The EU's growth has, in fact, gone hand in hand with the weakening of its various member states – and the corresponding failure to replace them with a continental or federal alternative.¹² Given its current enlargement to twenty-five members, political unity has become an even more remote prospect, particularly in that many of the new East European members lack any sense of the European idea.

A strong centralized state, however, is key to Europe's future. Since the Second World War, power is necessarily continental: Only a *Großraum* (large space), a geopolitically unified realm animated by a "distinct political idea," has a role to play in today's world.¹³ Yet even with the dissolution of

the East-West bloc, a continental state is not likely to emerge from the EU's expanding market system. If earlier state-building is any guide (think of Garibaldi's Italy, Kara-George's Serbia, Pearse's Ireland, or Washington's America), political unification requires a vision, a mobilizing project, emanating from a history of blood and struggle. As Jean Thiriart writes: "One does not create a nation with speeches, pious talk, and banquets. One creates a nation with rifles, martyrs, jointly lived dangers."¹⁴ For Grossouvre, this mobilizing vision is De Gaulle's *Grande Europe*: a political-civilizational *Großraum* pivoted on a Franco-German confederation (encompassing Charlemagne's *Francks de l'Ouest et Francks de l'Est*), allied with Russia, and forged in opposition to the modern Carthage.

The three great continental peoples, he believes, constitute the potential "core" around which a politically federated Europe will coalesce. Like De Gaulle, who refused to accept his country's defeat in 1940 and who fought all the rest of his life against the conquerors of 1945, Grossouvre views the entwined cultures of the French, Germans, and Russians as fundamentally different from *les Anglo-Saxons* (the English and the Americans), whose thalassocratic, Low Church, and market-based order favors a rootless, economic definition of national life. Accordingly, for most of her history, with the tragic exception of the 1870–1940 period, France's great enemy was "perfidious Albion," not Germany.¹⁵ Then, after 1945, this larger historical relationship was resumed, as numerous cooperative ventures succeeded in blunting nationalist antagonisms – to the point that war between them is now inconceivable.¹⁶ Finally, in 1963, when De Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer signed the Treaty of Elysée, their reconciliation was formalized on the basis of an institutionalized system of social, economic, and political collaborations. Their supranational commitment to Europe has since had a powerful synergetic effect, influencing virtually every significant measure undertaken in the name of continental unity. The complementary nature of these closely related peoples has, in fact, triumphed over the political disunity that came with the Treaty of Verdun (843).¹⁷ While a confederation between France and Germany is probably still on the distant horizon, the history of the last sixty years suggests that their national projects are converging.¹⁸ Until then, they are likely to continue to speak with a single voice, for France and Germany are more than two states among the EU's twenty-five. In addition to being the crucible of European civilization, their combined populations (142 million), their economic power (41 per cent of the EU), and, above all, their capacity to transcend national interests make them special – the nucleus, the motor, the vanguard of a potentially united Europe. Whatever political organization the EU eventually achieves will undoubtedly be one of their doing.

A somewhat different convergence is also under way in the East. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and Germany's ensuing reunification shifted

Europe's center of gravity eastward. The EU's enlargement to Eastern Europe this year moved it even farther in this direction. The consolidation of Europe's eastward expansion hinges, though, on Russia, whose white, Christian people, as the historian Dieter Groh argues, represents one of the great primeval stirrings of the European conscience.¹⁹ (It was the Roman Catholic Church, in its schism with Orthodox Christianity in 1054, not Russia's history, culture, or racial disposition that kept it from being recognized as a European nation.) France has ancient ties with Russia and today shares many of the same geopolitical interests. But it is Germany that is now most involved in Russian life. She is Russia's chief trading partner, her banks are the chief source of Russian investment capital, and her 1800 implanted entrepreneurs the leading edge of Russian economic development.²⁰ Thanks to these ties, along with bimonthly meetings between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Germany's Gerhard Schröder, Russia is presently engaged in numerous joint ventures with the EU. Together, they have put seven communications satellites into orbit, developed a global positioning system (Galileo) to rival the American one (GPS), signed numerous agreements in the field of aerospace research, given one another consultative voice in the other's military operations, upgraded and expanded the roads, canals, and railways linking them, brokered a series of deals related to gas and energy, and established an elaborate system of cultural exchanges. Visa-free travel between Russia and the EU is expected by 2007. And though Russia is too big to be integrated into the EU, she is nevertheless developing relations with it that portend ones of even greater strategic significance.

Russia also sees its future in Europe. Since the collapse of Communism and the imposition of what critical observers characterize as a "Second Treaty of Versailles," it has been on life-support.²¹ The economy is in shambles, the state discredited, society afflicted with various pathologies, and its former empire shattered. The appointment of Vladimir Putin in 1999 and his subsequent election as president in 2000 and again in 2004 represent a potential turnaround (even if he is not the ideal person to lead Russia). Full recovery is probably still far off, but it has begun and Europe — its capital, markets, and expertise — is necessary to it. Putin also believes Europe's growing estrangement from America's unilateral model of hegemony will eventually lead it into a collective security pact with Russia.²² Having distanced himself from the pro-American regime of the corrupt Yeltsin, whose liberal market policies were an excuse to plunder the accumulated wealth of the Russian people, and having had his various efforts at rapprochement rebuffed by the Bush administration (which continues to encroach on Russia's historical spheres of interest), this *Deutsche im Kreml* now looks to exploit his German connections to gain a wedge in European affairs.²³

His Eurocentric policies are already assuming strategic form, for Russia's vast oil reserves have the potential of satisfying all of Europe's energy

needs. (As russophobes say, Russia will build her hegemony in Europe with pipelines.) To consolidate these emerging East-West exchanges, Russia has recently received a €400 million grant to modernize its institutional, legal, and administration apparatus to accord with the EU's. At the same time, tariffs on Russian imports have been slashed (50 percent of Russian exports now go to the EU) and the EU is sponsoring Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization. Putin's arrest of the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, one of the principal proponents of U.S.-style "casino capitalism," and the seizure of his massive Yukos oil concern; the resignation of the last Yeltsin holdovers, especially Alexander Voloshin; and an on-going series of internal reforms, however incomplete, represent further steps toward a restoration of Russian state power.²⁴ Finally, Russia possesses the military capacity, even in its debilitated state, to guarantee Europe's security, for in a period when America's "new liberal imperialism" runs roughshod over European concerns, threatening endless conflicts detrimental to their interests, Russia suddenly becomes a credible defense alternative.²⁵

Grossouvre concludes that an axis based on France's political leadership, Germany's world class economy, and Russia's military might represent the potential nucleus of a future Eurasian state. Five distinct advantages, he argues, would follow from such a rapprochement: It would guarantee Europe's independence from America, correct certain imbalances in the globalization process, enhance the EU's security, solve its energy needs, and complement the different qualities of its allied members. If such an axis draws the chief continental powers into a more enduring alliance, it will inevitably reshape the international order, making the white men of the North – the Boreans – the single most formidable force in the world.²⁶ It should come as no surprise, then, that Grossouvre's most strident critics are to be found in those former left-wing Jewish ranks (as represented by Bernard-Henri Lévy, André Gluckmann, Alain Finkielkraut, etc.), who, like our home-grown neocons, champion the raceless, deculturated policies of Washington's New World Order.

A DEFENSIVE ALIGNMENT

The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis arose in reaction to the Second American War on Iraq. It needs thus to be understood in the context of that war, which the Bush administration treated as the second phase of its war on terror, the first being the invasion of Afghanistan and the assault on the Taliban regime harboring bin Laden's al-Qa'ida (both of which, incidentally, were, via the CIA and Pakistan's ISI, made in the U.S.A.).²⁷ However much it resembled the Anglo-Afghan and Russo-Afghan wars of the nineteenth century, the American assault on Afghanistan did not provoke the kind of opposition that Iraq would, for there was still enormous sympathy for the U.S. after "9/11." "Victory," moreover, came quickly, as it had for all

former conquerors. The Taliban were chased from Kabul and the warring tribes associated with the U.S.-supported Northern Alliance, which did most of the fighting on the ground, soon gained control of the countryside. While Afghanistan has since reverted to a pre-state form of regional, tribal rule (ideal for narco-terrorists) and most al-Qa'ida fighters succeeded in dispersing, the Bush administration was nevertheless able to broadcast publicly satisfying TV images of swift, forceful action.²⁸

Buoyed up by the nearly effortless rout of the medieval Taliban, Bush adopted the policies recommended by his neoconservative advisers,²⁹ whose neo-Jacobin assertion of American power not only has nothing to do with fighting Islamic terrorism, but cloaks a Judeo-liberal vision of global domination which threatens to turn the entire Middle East into something akin to Israel's occupation of the West Bank. Key to their vision is Iraq, whose threat to Israel has been repackaged by such Jewish propaganda mills as the Project for the New American Century as a threat to U.S. security. Besides promoting a peculiar blend of liberal statist and Zionist strategic concerns that represents a turn (not a break) in U.S. foreign policy, the Krauthammers, Wolfowitzes, and other sickly neocon types advising the administration seek to "Sharonize" Washington's strategic culture. To this end, military force is designated the option of choice and a moralistic Manichaeism which pits the U.S. and Israel against the world's alleged evils is used to legitimate the most dishonorable policies.³⁰ As the former wastrel of the Bush dynasty signed on to this Likud-inspired agenda, he began making a case for extending his antiterror crusade to Mesopotamia. Iraq's "Hitler-like tyrant," he claimed, had links with al-Qa'ida and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capable of reaching the United States.

While America's TV-besotted masses had little difficulty swallowing his unsubstantiated argument, the rest of the world balked.³¹ At this point in early 2002, the two shores of the Atlantic began pulling apart. German chancellor Gerhard Schröder was the first major European figure to oppose Bush's war plans. He was soon joined by French president Jacques Chirac. In July 2002 they issued a joint declaration formally rejecting the U.S. proposal, stating that the UN's embargo and its inspectors were doing their job and that the proposed attack would only distract from the "real war on terror." By September, Russia (whose economic situation required the good graces of Washington) hinted that it too would veto a UN resolution sanctioning war. Then, on February 10, 2003, Putin joined Chirac and Schröder in issuing a declaration condemning what one senior U.S. intelligence officer later called "an avaricious, premeditated, unprovoked war against a foe who posed no immediate threat."³²

The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis thus originated as a temporary coalition organized around a single point of agreement. Convinced that Bush had failed to make his case for war, the French, Germans, and Russians thought

the evidence for al-Qa'ida links and WMD was unconvincing (we know now, by the government's own admissions, that it was a tissue of lies, distortions, and manipulations).³³ Their coalition was nevertheless more than a response to a momentary disturbance in the world system. As one high-level Russian analyst characterized it, the coalition was a "rebellion against a unilateral America unwilling to accommodate European interest."³⁴ As such, it announced a possible geopolitical power shift from the Atlantic to Eurasia.

GLOBALISM AT GUNPOINT

Since the Cold War's end, international relations have undergone changes as fundamental as those following the world-historical realignment of 1945.³⁵ The neoconservatives influencing Bush, in their preemptive crusade for what is tendentiously labeled "global democracy," have been anxious to take advantage of these "shifting tectonic plates in international politics . . . before they harden again."³⁶ As Robert Kagan and William Kristol, two of the chief neocon publicists, argue: There is a danger today that an unassertive U.S. will lose control of the world order it created in 1945. Beginning with the fall of the Soviet Union, when the field was cleared of possible rivals, they believe the U.S. should have consolidated its "benevolent hegemony," turning the unipolar moment into the unipolar era. Instead, George I and Clinton allegedly failed to exploit the moment, further ensnaring the U.S. in multilateral relations that compromised its power and interests.³⁷

Against this trend, the Bush administration has carried out what some characterize as a "revolution in foreign policy." Without abandoning Washington's objective of developing a global market system based on American-style liberal-democratic principles, it now employs hegemonist methods, codified in the new Bush Doctrine, that change the way the U.S. asserts its power abroad.³⁸ In this vein, the administration dismisses international laws and institutions, as it asseverates America's unilateral right to alter the world system however it wishes, including attacking and overthrowing states deemed a threat to its security. Traditional strategies of deterrence and containment have consequently been supplanted by a proactive policy of prevention and preemption, just as ad hoc coalitions are given precedence over established alliances and collective security arrangements, regime change over negotiations with "failed" states, and ideological goals over previous notions of the national interest.³⁹

The entire tenor of American power has thus altered, but against those who claim Bush has abandoned the core assumptions of the liberal internationalist tradition, the conservative Andrew J. Bacevich points out that his foreign policy innovations are largely methodological in character. For the past half century, no matter which party occupied the White House, U.S. policy has pursued a single overarching goal: "global openness" – as

in Hay's "Open Door" imperialism—which promotes the movement of goods, peoples, and fashions into and out of world markets for the sake of U.S. capitalist concerns.⁴⁰ Moreover, in assuming responsibility for this integrated international trading system—this "empire"—the U.S. wins the right not only "to sell Big Macs and Disney products round the world," but to govern the system itself.

While Bacevich's argument is an excellent foil to those seeking to portray Bush as a revolutionary—somehow different from the Democrats who have manipulated the United States into most of the twentieth century wars and played a leading role in semantically transforming "democracy" and "human rights" into the totalitarian double-speak of the NWO—Bacevich nevertheless ignores the different ways in which the two parties implement their liberal internationalist principles. Republicans, especially since Reagan, are inclined to see the growth of U.S. national power as the precondition for sustaining their imperial system, while Democrats look to the universalization and institutionalization of their liberal principles. This disposes Republicans to a unipolar model of liberal internationalism based on military supremacy, unlike Democrats, who favor a world-government model emphasizing the economic facets of globalization and the need for international regulation. (Lately, though, the Democratic world-government types, if such influential liberal internationalists as those associated with Richard Haas of the Council on Foreign Relations and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the Brookings Institution are any guide, seem increasingly disposed to the unipolar model; John Kerry's neocon cloning of Bush's foreign policy also suggests a shift toward the Republican vision.) But whether pursued by Republicans or Democrats, this liberal internationalist agenda, with its emphasis on the antitraditional and anti-Aryan forces of free trade, free markets, and open societies, has been a bane to white people everywhere—for it wars against "the fundamental value of blood and race as creators of true civilization."⁴¹

In pressing into areas which were off-limits during the Cold War, Washington's imperial market system has become increasingly aggressive. Under Clinton, the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine of avoiding military engagements unless absolutely necessary was discarded, as the "unipolar moment" ushered in by the Soviet collapse was treated as a blank check for "intervening practically wherever and whenever it chose." In this spirit, Clinton's Secretary of State contemplated invading Iraq and disparaged the principle of national sovereignty. Her distinction between war and the use of military force has since reoriented U.S. policy, as military interventions overseas cease being labeled wars and become armed forms of "humanitarianism."⁴² Finally, the Clinton Doctrine of Enlargement, in championing the worldwide spread of U.S.-style democracy and free markets (that is, the globalist assault on national identity and national institutions), privileged

unilateralism (rechristened "assertive multilateralism") over containment and disarmament.⁴³

Although he avoided Bush's swaggering brand of leadership, Clinton was only slightly less coercive in promoting the totalitarian ideology of openness.⁴⁴ It is hardly irrelevant that Iraq was bombed nearly every day of his administration, that Bosnia was turned into a U.S. military protectorate, and that unilateral military action, in one of the great "war crimes" of the twentieth century, was taken against Serbia. Though smaller in scale than Operation Iraqi Freedom, the terrorist air assault on this proud little country (whose historical role was the defense of the white borderlands) aimed at "spreading democracy" for the sake of openness. Symptomatic of the "openness" Washington favors, the Albanian Liberation Front (UCK), an Islamic, drug-smuggling, terrorist mafia with links to al-Qa'ida, was armed and trained by Clinton's government and a quarter million Christian Serbs, whose nationalist aspirations represented an affront to the New World Order, were ethnically cleansed from Kosovo.⁴⁵ These interventions by the Clintonistas also played a leading role in destabilizing the international state system, giving rise to new stateless groups whose megaterrorism is historically unprecedented. The horror of 9/11 and the unfathomable massacre of Russian children at Beslan, not to mention numerous lesser affronts to our humanity, have roots in Clinton's Yugoslavian intervention. Bush has simply accelerated this process, which is nourishing new, more nihilistic forms of terrorism.⁴⁶

Although he came into office complaining of Clinton's immodest foreign policy, Bush II has actually gone further, introducing methods which removed the existing restraints on Washington's use of military force and whatever reservation it might have in violating national sovereignty.⁴⁷ Like Clinton, he is a man beholden to alien and dishonorable interests, and inspired by a juvenile notion of power. His "faith-based foreign policy," like the alley-cat policies of his predecessor, privileges the liberalization of global trade relations, imposes the cosmopolitan imperatives of his corporate supporters on virtually every issue pertinent to the nation's biocultural welfare, rejects the American tradition of "isolationism," and runs roughshod over whoever resists an order hostile to ethnocultural particularisms (unless they take innocuous folkloric forms). He might differ with Clinton in favoring a missile defense system, a different approach to China, and a Likudnik rather than a Laborite Zionism, but he is no less committed to a global system of market democracies "open to trade and investment, and policed by the United States." As one Marxist puts it: "Playboy Clinton, Cowboy Bush, same policy."⁴⁸ With his "Judeo-Protestant" rhetoric of American exceptionalism and his willingness to remove the velvet glove from America's mailed fist, Bush's "jackbooted Wilsonianism" differs

from that of his predecessor mainly in linking economic globalization to "military modernization."

As the neoconservatives Thomas Barnett and Henry Gaffney argue, the Bush Doctrine ought to be viewed as a necessary complement to the globalizing process. They claim that before 9/11 globalization (which much of the world identifies with Americanization) was mainly economic, thought best left to business. The collapse of the Twin Towers has since (allegedly) triggered a more serious reflection on America's role as globalism's "system administrator." In their view, bin Laden's al-Qa'ida, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and all the "rogue states" — Bush's "axis of evil" — act as "dangerous disconnects" from a world based on interdependence and a single framework of economic governance. (Although they refrain from taking their argument to its logical conclusion, globalization here is inadvertently revealed as the harbinger of global terror.)⁴⁹ Faced with these threats to its one-world system, the market not only needs to be policed, the U.S. has a responsibility to maintain its harmonious functioning. Bush's unilateralist use of force, in applying military power whenever violent "disconnects" interrupt the international flow of labor, raw materials, and energy, Barnett and Gaffney argue, aims at ensuring the security and operability of the globalizing process.⁵⁰ But what they do not mention is that once economic globalization is joined with "military globalization," the globalizing process is not so much ensured as altered, becoming less a neutral extension of economic trends (not that it ever was simply that) and more a classic expression of imperial power. In Iraq, for instance, the American army had no sooner occupied Baghdad than its neoconservative viceroy, Paul Bremer, began to dismantle the Iraqi state, privatize the economy, open the borders to unrestricted imports (unless they came from France or Germany), and, within two weeks of his arrival, had declared that Iraq was "now open for business."⁵¹

September 11, then, did not change the long-range goal of U.S. foreign policy (global openness), only the way in which it was pursued. The restraints on military force, already compromised under Clinton, were formally thrown off and a proactive doctrine of preemption superseded the more reactive methods of containment and disarmament. At the same time, Clinton's human rights rhetoric and "humanitarian" militarism were jettisoned for the bellicose language of "strategic vital interests" and "imperial responsibilities." It would be misleading, however, to think the transatlantic rift was due solely to Bush's militaristic assertion of U.S. global interests. Long before 9/11, real policy differences had begun to emerge: over trade; agriculture; armament exports; relations with Cuba, Iran, and Korea; the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; the Echelon economic espionage system monitoring European faxes, e-mails, and phone calls; the Kyoto Protocol; globalization; the abrogation of the ABM treaty; the euro and the dollar, etc. All these differences, in one way or another, reflected Europe's

unwillingness to remain a pawn on Washington's global chessboard.⁵² In the year leading up to Iraq, as Europe sought to check Bush's unilateralist moves, the transatlantic relationship went into crisis, forcing France and Germany to assert their autonomy sooner than they might otherwise have intended.⁵³

A PROMISING RAPPROCHEMENT

In the last instance, the U.S.-European rift of 2002–2003 followed from the Cold War's end, which destroyed the rationale for the transatlantic alliance and hence the restraints on European autonomy. For without the Red Army on the Elbe, Europe was no longer obliged to take orders from the West Wing. Because NATO has outlived its usefulness and Bush's unipolar security system made no accommodation to Europe's post-Cold War status, the more self-confident Europeans have begun to distance themselves from Washington.

However headline-capturing, their modest assertion of autonomy has nevertheless been carried out in ways that are thoroughly inadequate to Europe's independence, based as they are on principles of jurisprudence and ethics, rather than on more consequential forms of power. In Robert Kagan's now famous characterization, Europeans are from Venus and Americans from Mars, with the former acting as if the world were governed by abstract Kantian principles, ignorant of or unwilling to acknowledge the violent Hobbesian reality which Americans, especially after 9/11, have been forced to confront.⁵⁴ In other words, Europeans look to negotiations, diplomacy, and international law to resolve international disputes, while Americans emphasize the importance of military force. These differing "perspectives and psychologies of power," the antiwhite Kagan suggests, explain something of what divides the two shores of the Atlantic.⁵⁵ But perhaps more debilitating than Europe's "Kantianism" (which will not last) is the fact that its increasingly autonomous foreign policy is less an expression of its political identity (although it is that) than a symptom of its liberal evasion of what such an identity ought to entail.

In France, for instance, which is the sole continental country to have defended the European idea in the last half century, as well as maintained a nuclear arsenal and professional army worthy of a "power," opposition to U.S. unilateralism has been framed largely in liberal internationalist terms that draw attention away from the state's failed domestic policies. Since De Gaulle's death, France has been in decline. The population is aging, millions of inassimilable Muslim immigrants are colonizing its lands, and virtually all the major institutions are in need of reform. Having eyes only for the "poor immigrant," the metastasizing state bureaucracy imposes unrealistic social laws that hamper production and serve as a force for national decline. At the same time, the historical sources of nationalism have

been dissolved, the native French dispirited by the institutionalization of multiculturalism, and the country's extraordinary military and diplomatic apparatus, the necessary basis of both French and European power, if not neglected, then underfunded.⁵⁶ The hoopla that comes with France's resistance to Bush simply focuses attention away from these failures and toward geopolitical developments that are potentially key to Europe's future, but whose import is limited by the state's misconceived domestic policies. As Julius Evola puts it: "The measure of freedom is power."⁵⁷ And because Europeans are now uncomfortable with the exercise of power, their freedom is necessarily limited.

It is worth recalling that Jacques Chirac was responsible for the totalitarian mobilization against the presidential candidacy of the nationalist Jean Marie Le Pen in 2002.⁵⁸ Like much of the European governing class, he is a product of the same plutocratic system that subordinates national interests to international finance, indifferent to everything associated with his people's blood and soil.⁵⁹ Such a system, as our own experiences reveal, is incapable of producing anything other than mediocrities. In this spirit, Chirac's opposition to Washington's unipolar order orients to a multipolar model based on liberal market principles hostile to Europe's unique bioculture. As Guillaume Faye points out, Chirac's opposition to the Iraq war was motivated less by his Gaullist nationalism (which he routinely betrays) than by his pacifist and Third World politics.⁶⁰ With the 2007 presidential elections in view, his foreign policy seems, in fact, aimed at the new Muslim electorate, which thrives on his anti-American, Third World, and multilateralist posturing.⁶¹

Faye also claims that American power is ultimately a reflex of Europe's refusal of power.⁶² Like many commentators, he stresses that U.S. power in this period is greatly exaggerated and goes unchecked mainly for want of challengers. Revealingly, Chirac has, for all his opposition to Bush, done little to rearm Europe and what he does do he does for the worst of reasons, neglecting *Grande Europe* in the name of a legalistic idealism that contradicts the biocultural foundations of European life. Rather than fixating on the illegalities and incivilities of American unilateralism (which has proven to be a paper tiger in Iraq), he and other establishment leaders would make a greater contribution to Europe's destiny if they devoted more attention to its military, restored the basis of its national identity, and addressed the real dangers coming from the South. Worse, they whole-heartedly subscribe to the American model of ethnopluralism, communitarianism, and multiculturalism. Just as U.S. leaders think nothing of sending troops halfway around the world to fight a war whose immediate beneficiary is Israel, ignoring the more serious security threat posed by the Third World's incessant assaults on the country's southern border, European elites (and the demonstrators massed behind them) trumpet their solidarity with the Islamic Middle East,

whose immigrants are presently rending the fabric of European life. There are good reasons for opposing Bush's war, but the liberal ones motivating Chirac cannot but come back to haunt the continent.

Germany's relationship with the U.S. is significantly different than France's, but no less infused with noxious anti-identitarian influences. She (Germany) was virtually remade by the Americans after 1945 and throughout the Cold War remained subservient to them. Yet Germany is slowly beginning to throw off her tutelage. Schröder nevertheless adheres to values and policies that qualify as examples of Kagan's Kantianism (i.e., pure liberalism). More than Chirac, he upholds Washington's earlier liberal internationalism, criticizing Bush for violating its principles.⁶³ (As one journalist for the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* writes: "We [Germans] owe a great debt to the U.S. for contributing to our transformation into truly democratic citizens after World War II...They [Americans] must forgive us if we have difficulty letting go some of the lessons we have learned.")⁶⁴ It was thus his pacifism—his Social Democratic opposition to power per se—rather than any geopolitical ambition for a powerful Europe that seems to have prompted his opposition to the Iraq war.⁶⁵ And in this, alas, he resembles much of the German population, which prefers bourgeois comforts to those virtues that made earlier generations great. Finally, Schröder, like Chirac, supports Turkey's admission to the EU and panders to the new "German Turk" electorate. He might therefore have been the first German chancellor since Hitler to frontally oppose Washington, but he has no intention of letting the old antiliberal dream of white renaissance out of the bag.⁶⁶

Despite the mediocre stature of these politicians, which makes them ill-suited to the great tasks at hand, I would argue that the "force of things"—the realities of power and the dictates of survival—is greater than those charged with carrying them out.⁶⁷ This seems especially evident in Europe's rapprochement with Russia. For as France and Germany become increasingly alienated from the U.S., they lean eastward—even though French and German elites have much more in common with their American than their Russian counterparts.⁶⁸

A rapprochement between the three great European peoples promises great things. As Karl Haushofer once said: "The day when Germans, Frenchmen, and Russians unite will be the last day of Anglo-Saxon [i.e., liberal] hegemony."⁶⁹ Bush—and this is why his administration seems destined to achieve world-historical significance—has brought about what a century of U.S. geostrategists have sought to prevent. Conversely, it is hardly coincidental that even at the Cold War's height, a wing of the French military looked to Russia as a possible ally. In 1955, the prominent geostrategist, Admiral Raoul Castex, published an article titled "*Moscou, rempart de l'Occident?*" (Moscow, rampart of the West?), in which he wondered if Russia might not one day become "the vanguard of the white

world's defense."⁷⁰ Today, in a period when *Grande Europe*—from Dublin to Vladivostok—is at peace, white nationalists in Europe and America again pose Castex's question and again affirm the possibility that Russia has a leading role to play in the white race's defense. Indeed, the question now possesses a qualitatively greater weight than it did a half century ago, before the Third World hordes, abetted by the West's liberal elites, began their colonization of our lands. Russia, moreover, is not just the last white nation on earth, but the only one to have shown the slightest interest in defending its ethnoracial identity. (Our russophobic nationalists might be reminded that the former Soviet Union was the sole white power to define nationality racially.) Its heritage of nationalism, socialism, and anti-liberalism also lends it something of that "Prussian socialism" which Spengler and Yockey saw as the one viable antidote to Western liberalism.⁷¹ In courting Russian support in their conflict with the U.S., French and German elites might think Putin will be converted to their misconceived Kantianism, but in the great racial-civilizational battles that lie ahead, it is far more likely that Russia's ethnonationalism will prevail.⁷²

AMERICA'S FUTURE

Since the rise to world power of the United States, white America has been in decline. For most of the twentieth century, but especially since the end of the Second World War, the country's overlords have taken one step after another to de-Europeanize its white population. To this end, white culture and identity have been socially re-engineered. White communities, schools, and businesses have been forced to integrate with races previously considered inferior and inimical. And, for the last forty years, whites have been expected to replace themselves with Third World immigrants. As the biocultural identity of white Americans gives way to a universal, transnational, and global one (the ideological analogue of the New World Order), they are further alienated from who they are.⁷³ Against this de-Europeanization and the postnational, multiracial regime succeeding it, the small, isolated pockets of white resistance confront a seemingly impossible task—similar to the one King Canute faced when he tried to hold back the ocean tide. Because of this, I would argue that *only a catastrophe will save white America*. Only a catastrophic collapse of the political, institutional, and cultural systems associated with imperial America—call it the managerial state, liberal democracy, corporate capitalism, the NWO, or whatever label you prefer—holds out any possibility that a small, racially conscious vanguard of white Americans will succeed in defending their people's existence.⁷⁴ With the Iraq war, Bush—"this Buster Keaton of the apocalypse"—has opened a Pandora's box of catastrophes. He, in fact, has done more to discredit, weaken, and vilify the existing systems of liberal subversion than any previous president, inadvertently creating conditions

that should give white Americans another chance to regain control of their destiny. In this spirit, his administration acts as “a lightning rod for catastrophes.” As one foreign observer notes: “The paradox of the present situation is that the worse the crisis becomes, the more Washington reinforces the position that evokes so much resistance.”⁷⁵ Indeed, his “war on terror creates more monsters than it destroys.”⁷⁶ Lacking the cognitive and normative tools to deal with a complex area like the Mideast, the president ends up managing the Iraqi occupation “by the seat of his pants.”⁷⁷ And as he does, the real dangers threatening the country are totally ignored: the dangers posed by the mestizo and Asiatic colonization of our lands, the growth of U.S. Muslim communities, the denationalization of the economy and the looming fiscal crisis of the state, the Zionist domination of the political and information systems, the replacement of truth with propaganda and disinformation, the deculturation and miscegenation of our people, and the unrelenting assault on everything associated with the “freedoms” he allegedly defends in Mesopotamia. Instead of inaugurating a new era of unchallenged American power and enhancing national security, Bush seems set on preparing their demise.⁷⁸ Since the murderous terror of 9/11, his administration has shattered the myth of American military omnipotence, tarnished the country’s moral authority, alienated its allies, squandered its once formidable diplomatic powers, created the basis of an anti-U.S. realignment, and undermined America’s image not only as a force for democracy and order, but as a secure economic haven. This latter tendency is now causing overseas investors to think twice about sending their capital to the U.S., which, combined with the ballooning expenses of the Iraq war, is hastening the dollar’s decline and the country’s economic deterioration. But more than undermining American power and prestige, the Bush administration has discredited the liberal civilizational model associated with the United States, provoking, in the process, a worldwide revulsion against the “American way of life.”⁷⁹

The simple-minded, dishonorable, and raceless character of Bush’s government—riddled with Israeli spies and unsavory influence peddlers and premised on the belief that truth is irrelevant to its political calculus—seems to epitomize nothing so much as the debilitated state of our governing classes and their inability to serve as a nation-bearing stratum. That for the first time in American history Europe is not the focus of U.S. strategic thinking, but rather Israel, should say it all.⁸⁰ It would be misleading, though, to think the failures at the highest level of state are simply the result of an unusually incompetent administration or its alien controllers. For even the “opposition” party produces candidates who are but variants of the reigning mediocrity.⁸¹ This suggests that the system itself is bankrupt. Not coincidentally, the telltale signs of blockage, symptomatic of regimes heading toward the abyss (or “staying the course,” as George II says),

appear now with increased frequency. The great bard of our decline, H. Millard, likens America to a runaway train. "The Israel firsters, neurotics, low IQ PTA types, political opportunists, easily susceptible dupes, genocidal blenders, party loyalists, war profiteers, and opportunists of various stripes" who are at the controls either have no idea of what they are doing or an unwillingness to profess it publicly.⁸²

Contrary to the pipedreams of both our conservatives and liberals, there will be no going back.⁸³ Like the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the U.S. has become bogged down in a protracted war at the very moment its economy is in steep decline. The slash-and-burn policies Bush has introduced will also be extremely difficult to retract, no matter who captures the White House in 2008. But even if there were a desire to retract them, the means are lacking. For example, in 1956, when Dwight Eisenhower warned France and England not to retake the Suez Canal, after Egypt nationalized it, he was able to threaten the stability of their national currencies. Today, the dollar is itself threatened.⁸⁴ For all the fabled shock and awe of U.S. power in this period, the country is qualitatively weaker than it was a generation ago, when it was able to rein in the largest European empires. This erosion of its economic, diplomatic, moral, and even military power, combined with the near universal opposition to its increasingly unilateral and militaristic foreign policy, cannot but provoke a geopolitical realignment. The prospect of the Iraq war spreading to Iran and elsewhere will simply compound these destabilizing forces.⁸⁵ Increased conflict abroad, growing dissent at home, and deep division within the government itself are also likely to foster decisional paralysis, further exacerbating the crisis.

But however this crisis plays out, America and Europe seem set on a collision course.⁸⁶ Already wary of Washington, France and Germany (along with Spain, Belgium, and Italy, once Berlusconi goes) will eventually have no choice but to reposition themselves in opposition to it, for their strategic imperatives are increasingly at odds. This is certain to trigger new conflicts and new alignments, compelling Europeans to reaffirm their sovereignty – and their distinct strategic identity. As they do, their cooperation is bound to deepen and their nationalist consciousness to grow. At the same time, certain mentalities will be forced to change and certain taboos to fall, including the postmodern ones that leave Europe powerless. The collapse of the Cold War alliance system also throws open the strategic-political parameters of the international arena. The future, as a consequence, now holds out several possible alternatives. The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis may still lack credibility, but this is probably less important than the effect it has had – and will continue to have – on the European spirit. It thus promises a possible renewal. The big question is whether or not Europeans have the will and acumen to realize it.

Fundamental to virtually all schools of geopolitical thought is the notion that the augmentation of power in one part of the world inevitably comes at the expense of another part. If the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis continues to affect the continent and shift power out of the Atlanticist camp, this cannot but destabilize the United States, for without its omnipotent dollar and its domination of global markets, it will no longer be able to consume more than it produces, to live on credit, to afford the social-welfare measures that buy off the Africans and tame the Mexicans, to sustain the social-engineering schemes discriminating against the talents and energies of its white majority, to afford the police, the drugs, the TVs, and the computer toys that narcotize its cretinized masses. The institutionalization of such an axis is also likely to dislodge America's dominant place in the world system, setting off economic disruptions that will make it impossible for whites to live in the old way, to lose themselves in vacuous material comforts, to accept the lies that fly in the face of reality. Once this point is reached, European-Americans will be forced to act like people elsewhere who are suddenly thrown into a do-or-die situation.⁸⁷

Like the "American Century" Henry Luce announced in 1941, the "New American Century" of Washington's current generation of schemers and chiselers promises an even greater holocaust of our people. The future they envisage might indeed be called the New Antiwhite Century. For like the order issuing from their Second World War, the one planned for the period following Iraq will not serve white America, only the alien, plutocratic, and cosmopolitan interests aligned in the current Washington-London-Tel Aviv axis.

No one should be surprised, then, that when the inevitable collapse comes, white America's frontfighters will not mourn the eclipse of the so-called American Century, for they are nationalists not in the nineteenth century sense. They do not fight for the petty-statism of the so-called "nation-state" – which is now made up of peoples from many different nations. The American, German, and French states – none of these entities any longer represent the descendants of those who founded them. As Sam Francis puts it, "the state has become the enemy of the nation."⁸⁸ And as a thousand years of European history demonstrate, whenever the state and the nation come into conflict, the latter inevitably proves the stronger. I think it is no exaggeration to claim that only on the ruins of the existing political order will white America be reborn – and reborn not as another constitutional "nation-state" which elevates abstract rights above biocultural imperatives, but as a northern imperium of white peoples who, as Bismarck exhorted, "think with their blood."

Those who would dismiss the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis as a temporary happenstance, a product of convenience, inflated with purely speculative significance, should be reminded that the twenty-first century will decide

if white people have a future or not. From this perspective, collapse and realignment are necessities—and necessities have a way of engendering the imagination appropriate to them. For when the world's population reaches ten billion, when China, India, and all Asia challenge the white man's dominance, when the colored multitudes crossing our borders are magnified by ten or a hundred, when oil is depleted and raw materials are used up, when all the forests have been cut down and all the cultivable lands claimed, and—hopefully—when the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis has established an alternative realm of white existence, the ensuing chaos cannot but sunder whatever misbegotten allegiance white Americans have had to the present system. Then, in alliance with their kinsmen in Europe and Russia, they—if they are to survive as a people—will have no choice but to accept that they are made not in the multihued images of a deracinated humanity, but in that of the luminous Boreans, whose destiny opposes the darkening forces of Bush's America.

Let us prepare for the coming collapse.

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a possible sphere of vital interests for global terrorists." See Alexander Dugin, "Premiers signes de l'apocalypse" (October 18, 2004), <http://www.voxnr.com>

50. Thomas Barnett and Henry Gaffney, "Operation Iraqi Freedom Could Be the First Step toward a Larger Goal: True Globalization," *Military Officer* 1(5) (May 2003); also Thomas Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century* (New York: Putnam, 2004). Cf. Alain Joxe, "Les enjeux stratégiques globaux après la guerre d'Iraq" (May 27, 2003), <http://www.ehess.fr>

51. Naomi Klein, "Baghdad Year Zero: Pillaging Iraq in Pursuit of a Neocon Utopia," *Harper's Bazaar* (September 2004).

52. Charles A. Kupchan, "The End of the West," *The Atlantic Monthly* (November 2002).

53. Europe's growing alienation from the U.S. is thus not just about the latter's unilateralist bullying. In addition to the above cited issues, it also touches on the drug-running, mafia, terrorist, and espionage networks that the U.S. operates in Europe. For example, see Rémi Kaufer, *L'arme de la désinformation: Les multinationales américaines en guerre contre l'Europe* (Paris: Grasset, 1999); Xavier Raufer, *Le grand réveil des mafias* (Paris: Lattés, 2003); Karl Richter, *Tödliche Bedrohung USA: Waffen und Szenarien der globalen Herrschaft* (Tübingen: Hohenrain Verlag, 2004); Alexander del Valle, *Guerres contre l'Europe* (Paris: Syrtes, 2001); Robert Steuckers, "Espionage par satellites, guerre cognitive, manipulation par les mafias" (November 2003), <http://www.centrostudaruna.it>; Thierry Meyssen, "Propagande états-unien" (January 2, 2003), <http://www.reseauvoltage.net>

54. Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003), p. 3. Actually, the unreferenced metaphor originates with Denis MacShane, "Europe and America Need Each Other More Than Ever," <http://www.post-gazette.com>

55. Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, p. 28.

56. Guillaume Faye, *La colonisation de l'Europe: Discours vrai sur l'immigration et l'Islam* (Paris: L'Encre, 2000); Nicolas Baverez, *La France qui tombe* (Paris: Perrin, 2004).

57. Julius Evola, *Imperialismo pagano: Il fascismo dinanzi al pericolo euro-cristiano* (Padua: Ar, 1996), p. 45.

58. Yves Daoudal, *Le tour infernal: 21 avril-5 mai* (Paris: Godefroy de Bouillon, 2003).

59. Yves-Marie Laulan, *Jacques Chirac et le déclin français 1974-2002* (Paris: François-Xavier de Guilbert, 2001); Emmanuel Ratier, *Le vrai visage de Jacques Chirac* (Paris: Facta, 1995).

60. Faye, *Le coup d'Etat mondial*, p. 113.

61. Omer Taspinar, "Europe's Muslim Streets," *Foreign Policy* (March-April 2003).

62. As Schröder says: "Es gibt nicht zu viel Amerika, es gibt zu wenig Europa." See "Die Krise, die Europa eint: Ein Gespräch mit Gerhard Schröder," *Die Zeit* (14/2003). Cf. Philippe Grasset, "Le dilemme stratégique des U.S.A: Sa faiblesse militaire" (June 15, 2004), <http://www.dedefensa.org>

63. Günter Maschke, "Vereinigten Staaten sind die Macht der Unordnung," *Deutsche Stimme* (June 2003).

64. Quoted in Richard Lambert, "Misunderstanding Each Other," *Foreign Affairs* (March–April 2003).
65. Alexander Rar, "Europa ist Zerspaltet" (December 15, 2003), <http://evrazia.org>
66. Edouard Husson, "Crise allemande, crise européenne?" (March 2003), <http://www.diploweb.com>
67. As Joseph de Maistre said of the revolutionaries of 1789: "Ce ne sont point les hommes qui mènent la révolution, c'est la révolution qui emploie les hommes." See *Considérations sur la France* (Lyon: Vitte, 1924), p. 7.
68. Maja Heidenreich, "Europa und Russland: Eine rückblickende und analysierende Darstellung" (n.d.), <http://www.boschlektoren.de/a-sites/projektterasse/fer-tigeprojekte/csteck/maja.doc>
69. Quoted in Sacha Papovic, "De la dialectique géopolitique" (August 2003), <http://www.voxnr.com>
70. Cited in "Russie-France-Allemagne" (n.d.), <http://www.paris-berlin-moscou.org>
71. Oswald Spengler, *Preussentum und Sozialismus* (Munich: Beck, 1919); K. R. Bolton, ed., *Varange: The Life and Thoughts of Francis Parker Yockey* (Paraparamu, NZ: Renaissance Press, 1998), pp. 36–38. Also N. N. Alexeiev, "Raisons spirituelles de la civilisation eurasiiste" (1998), <http://www.voxnr.com>
72. W. Joseph Stoupe, "The Inevitability of a Eurasian Alliance" (August 17, 2004), <http://atimes.com>
73. James Kurth, "The War and the West," *Orbis* (Spring 2002).
74. Guillaume Faye, *Avant-Guerre: Chronique d'un cataclysme annoncé* (Paris: L'Æncre, 2002).
75. Philippe Grasset, "Comment Rumsfeld devient le garante de l'aventure irakienne" (May 11, 2004), <http://www.dedefense.org>
76. François-Bernard Huyghe, *Quatrième guerre mondiale: Faire mourir et faire croire* (Paris: Rocher, 2004), p. 9.
77. D. Priest and T. E. Ricks, "Growing Pessimism on Iraq: Doubts Increase within U.S. Security Agencies," *The Washington Post*, September 29, 2004.
78. Philippe Grasset, "La destruction méthodique de la puissance américaine" (September 27, 2004), <http://www.dedefensa.org>; Guatam Adhikari, "The End of the Unipolar Myth," *International Herald Tribune*, September 27, 2004.
79. Philippe Grasset, "Comment l'américainisme est en train d'apparaître pour ce qu'il est: un problème de civilisation" (September 1, 2004), <http://www.dedefensa.org>
80. Brent Scowcroft, George I's national security adviser, has publicly criticized George II for being "inordinately influenced by Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. 'Sharon just has him wrapped around his little finger', Scowcroft said. 'I think the president is mesmerized.'" See "Key GOP Figure Raps Bush on Mideast," *San Francisco Chronicle*, October 17, 2004.
81. Ehsan Ahari, "How Bush, Kerry Are One and the Same" (September 2, 2004), <http://atimes.com>
82. H. Millard, "Ridin' the Runaway Train Named America" (2004), <http://www.newnation.org>

83. Françoise Vergniolle de Chantal, "Les débats américains sur la relations transatlantiques" (2004), <http://robert-schuman.org>
84. Ian Williams, "Deterring the Empire" (May 13, 2003), <http://www.alternet.org>
85. David Wood, "U.S. to Sell Precision-Guided Bombs to Israel" (September 23, 2004), <http://www.newhousesnews.com>
86. Ian Black, "The Transatlantic Drift," *The Guardian*, September 20, 2004; Philippe Grasset, "L'UE: Une stratégie de rupture avec l'Amérique" (September 20, 2004), <http://www.dedefensa.org>
87. Faye, *Avant-Guerre*.
88. Sam Francis, "When the State Is the Enemy of the Nation" (July 19, 2004), <http://www.vdare.com> This is not to say that the state is inherently the enemy of the nation — only that this is the case with the existing liberal state. On the difference between statism and nationalism, see Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).