

A SUPERFLUOUS REVIEW

Cultural Insurrections

Essays on Western Civilization, Jewish Influence, and Anti-Semitism

Kevin MacDonald

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Reviewed by Garnet James Wolseley

Back when *The New Yorker* was a serious magazine and not as helplessly leftist as it is today, it used to run lengthy articles—usually in several parts—that were later published as books. I was impressed by how the magazine then “reviewed” the resulting books. It would note the title, author, and publisher and then add, “the contents originally appeared in these pages.” Nothing more. This was, of course, higher praise than the most laudatory review. Anything *The New Yorker* had originally published was, by definition, of the highest quality.

With the exception of just three essays, the contents of *Cultural Insurrections*, by Kevin MacDonald, originally appeared in these pages. For *The Occidental Quarterly* no less than for *The New Yorker*, this fact alone should be sufficient praise. No “review” is necessary. At the same time, if a review there is to be, it must be written in light of the fact that many of its readers saw the essays in *Cultural Insurrections* when they first appeared. These readers are as familiar with Kevin MacDonald as I, and no doubt admire his work just as much.

This “review” will therefore not attempt to summarize or characterize the enormous number of ideas contained in *Cultural Insurrections* but will instead do just two things: pick a bone with one aspect of MacDonald’s magisterial analysis of Jewish ethnocentrism and offer a few comments on his insights into the nature and psychology of Western Man. This latter question is ultimately what matters to us. Endlessly fascinating though the Jews may be, it is our own heritage and our own fate with which we must be most concerned.

The essays in *Cultural Insurrections* lie in an odd but not uncomfortable relation to MacDonald’s celebrated trilogy on Jewish ethnocentrism. The book could be described as a series of learned footnotes on the trilogy, so anyone who has not read it is at a disadvantage. At the

same time, the essays in the first section of the book, which describe the traits, objectives, and methods of Jewish activists, are a succinct summary of the trilogy's main themes and allow *Cultural Insurrections* to stand on its own. Other essays are deeper explorations of matters only touched on in the trilogy: the Jewish role in the Soviet system, a study of prominent neoconservative personalities, and even an analysis of Henry Ford's notorious but now unread newspaper series, *The International Jew*. The third part of the book constitutes MacDonald's very original and stimulating examination of Western Man.

I believe that MacDonald's conception of Jews is irrefutable: they are, in the aggregate, a tightly-knit, competitive group that puts its interests above those of others while disguising those interests as being entirely compatible with and even to the benefit of others. These themes been developed at length and with great power in these pages and need no elaboration.

There is nevertheless one aspect of MacDonald's analysis that I find jarring, and that is the motive he sometimes ascribes to Jewish activism: hatred. He writes that, "Jewish hatred towards non-Jews emerges as a consistent theme throughout the ages" (p. 25). Of the Soviet and East European revolutionaries, he asserts that, "Jewish radicals hated everything about their national cultures except for one or two literary figures" (p. 63). Even less convincingly, he writes of "Jewish hatred toward the traditional peoples and culture of the United States" (p. 27).

It is certainly possible to find examples of hateful things Jews have said and done, but is it accurate—and is it useful—to describe Jews as actively hating the people among whom they live? Perhaps the Bolshevik revolutionaries, whose motives MacDonald discusses in the chapter called "Stalin's Willing Executioners," and who may themselves have suffered in pogroms, could accurately be described as hating Russians. But do American Jews really hate "the traditional peoples and culture of the United States"? Do French Jews hate France?

In a chapter called "Neoconservative Portraits" MacDonald describes the careers and dissects the loyalties of people such as Richard Perle, Charles Krauthammer, Elliot Abrams, Douglas Feith, and Michael Ledeen. I am convinced that these people and many like them unhesitatingly put Israel's interests before those of the United States. I do not doubt that in conversations among themselves, many Jews are explicit about their primary loyalties. But does Elliot Abrams hate the

United States and his gentile colleagues?

Many American and European Jews—according to some estimates as many as half—now marry gentiles. People do not marry people they hate. The neoconservatives MacDonald profiles are not, to my knowledge, married to gentiles, and some even write openly against intermarriage, but the feelings of opposition, isolation, or suspicion some American Jews may have for the United States certainly does not rise to the level of hatred. Most Jews probably see gentiles as genial simpletons whose interests can be casually sacrificed to those of the tribe, but they do not harbor any desire to destroy us.

MacDonald is correct in underlining the terrible harm Jews have done American gentiles. By convincing so many of them that white ethnocentrism is a moral flaw, Jews have helped establish a series of racial and immigration policies that will have no other outcome than the destruction of the nation whites built on this continent, and the eventual elimination of whites as a distinct people with their own culture.

It is nevertheless a mistake to assume that the motive was vicious because the outcome was monstrous. A wolf eats a rabbit. He eats the rabbit because he is hungry, not because he hates the rabbit or wants to obliterate rabbit society. The rabbit may think the wolf hates him because the wolf wants to kill him, but the rabbit is wrong. The wolf is only putting his interests over those of the rabbit.

Jews have promoted Third-World immigration because they believed—correctly—that in a mixed society with no racial or cultural core their own ethnocentrism would attract less disapproving attention. They have not promoted Third-World immigration because they wanted to destroy America, even if that is the inevitable result.

Let us suffer the wolf-rabbit analogy a moment longer. It is not in the interests of the wolf to destroy rabbit society. It is far better for the wolf that rabbit society prosper, and provide him and his family with many more dinners than that it go to the wall. Likewise, some Jews are beginning to understand that one of their goals—an up-for-grabs America in which Jews do not stand out as suspiciously different—conflicts with another goal: keeping America strong so it can protect Israel. A cash-strapped, Afro-Caribbean-Hispanic United States in which the telephones don't work will have other priorities than invading and defanging Israel's enemies.

Jews have always adapted strategies to circumstances. The goal of

an up-for-grabs America was based on a twentieth-century European model of Jewish-gentile relations, in which gentile suspicions of Jews had a proven potential to do serious mischief. That model does not apply to the United States, which has never subjected Jews to anything more sinister than a country-club instinct to keep them at a distance. Here, Jews have entrenched and enriched themselves as never elsewhere. It is because of their influence in the United States that Jews can control countries where they have no presence at all. It would be a disastrous mistake for them to turn America into a dung heap, especially since the reason for doing so—the fear that Americans could become storm troopers overnight—was so absurdly overdrawn.

Jews, therefore, are beginning to rethink their plans. In stark contrast to the 1960s, when they despised American patriotism and mocked the army, Jews now find themselves keen on armed intervention and even indulge in a bit of awkward flag-waving. If Jews were motivated by hatred of America rather than by ethno-Zionist interests they would continue to laugh at patriotism and despise the army. They have changed their tactics because conditions have changed since the attacks of September 11.

I believe they will change their tactics again. Fully conscious as I am of the protection provided by a pseudonym, I hazard a prediction: Jews will slowly, ever so slowly, begin to realize that their fanatic promotion of open borders weakens the United States. Since we are virtually the sole support for Israel, they are far better served by a strong United States, and millions of unteachable Mexicans do not make America strong. Jews will change their tactics because their motive is not hatred but survival.

But why does it matter if MacDonald is wrong to think Jews hate the United States, especially since their actions over the past century probably could not have been more damaging if they actually *did* hate the United States? It matters for two reasons. First, it is vital to understand one's opponents. People who hate you will never compromise, whereas people who are just pursuing interests will. Gentiles should never forget that Jewish interests often conflict with gentile interests. However, the butcher's interests conflict with yours, too, but because you do not hate him, and he does not hate you, you can do business to mutual advantage. If we assume Jews hate us we will never be able to compromise, and compromise is almost always better than feuding.

The second reason is that a good way to provoke hatred is to impute hatred where none exists. MacDonald has demonstrated very convincingly how sensitive Jews are merely to scrutiny, much less criticism. It is no light matter to accuse an entire people of hatred. Whites who care about the survival of their people are invariably said to be haters. Jews care about the survival of *their* people, and although we may deplore the price they expect us to pay for their survival, we can expect nothing but resentment and suspicion if we accuse them of hatred.

If American Jews and gentiles ever work out a satisfactory way to run this country, it will be gentiles who have read and absorbed MacDonald's books who do it. Accusations of hatred will only make the task more difficult. Some gentiles—perhaps MacDonald among them—might argue that the idea of doing business or finding compromises with Jews is absurd, but they should consider very carefully whether they really prefer the alternative.

Let us now turn to MacDonald's treatment of Western Man. Nearly 100 pages of *Cultural Insurrections* are devoted to this question, which represents a departure from the central themes of the trilogy. MacDonald turns to this subject out of a combination of despair at the terrible risks whites are running because of their inability to act in their own interests and respect for the ability of Jews to act in theirs.

MacDonald argues that for both genetic and cultural reasons gentile whites show low levels of ethnocentrism, especially compared to what he calls the hyperethnocentrism of Jews. "[B]ecause of the harsh environment of the Ice Age, the Nordic peoples evolved in small groups and have a tendency towards social isolation" (p. 297), he writes. "Under ecologically adverse circumstances, adaptations are directed more at coping with the adverse physical environment than at competing with other groups, and in such an environment, there would be less pressure for selection for extended kinship networks and highly collectivist groups" (p. 288). Jews evolved in a warmer, Middle-Eastern climate that fostered tribal networks and alliances, both of which require high levels of group consciousness.

For the last 1500 years the Church has also pushed Europeans in an egalitarian, individualist direction by requiring monogamy. MacDonald notes that in virtually every other society, wealthy men have had multiple wives. Solomon was famous for his 300 wives and 700 concubines, and Chinese emperors had hundreds of wives, whom

they serviced systematically according to the timing of their menstrual cycles so as to have as many children as possible. The Incas of Peru permitted polygamy according to military rank: commanders had thirty wives while lesser officers had fifteen, eight, or seven, according to rank.

MacDonald marvels at the uniqueness of European society, in which a celibate, childless pope had the power to force monogamy on crowned kings. This encouraged nuclear households and high status for women, and established the important precedent of a single norm of conduct for men at every level of society. This encouraged individuality and equality rather than clan-building and hierarchy.

“Such a perspective would not imply that Northern Europeans lack collectivist mechanisms for group competition,” MacDonald adds, “but only that these mechanisms are relatively less elaborated and/or require a higher level of group conflict to trigger their expression” (p. 287).

It is certainly the case today that whites show lower levels of group consciousness than members of any other race. But have they really evolved to be genetically less ethnocentric than others, or have they been denatured by powerful cultural factors? MacDonald suspects a combination of the two, with Jews as key impresarios for the shift in culture. Whatever the cause, the change in whites has been remarkable. Jared Taylor quotes a particularly stirring example of the way whites used to think:

The Treaties of Tientsin were signed with China in June, 1858. All parties agreed that they would be ratified in Peking the next year. The English, French, and American envoys, escorted by gunboats, sailed up the Pehio River on their way to Peking, but found their passage blocked by barricades supported by gun emplacements on the banks. The British and French decided to force passage, but the Americans were neutral and did not take part in the engagement.

The Chinese gunners turned out to be first rate, and the Europeans, especially the British, took a terrible pounding. At length, Josiah Tattnall, commander of the American fleet, could stand it no longer. Uttering the famous words, “Blood is thicker than water. I’ll be damned if I will stand by and see white men butchered before my eyes,” he went into action against the Chinese.

Subsequent reaction in both the United States and England was wide-spread approval.¹

Taylor fails to note that Tattnall had fought the British Navy during the War of 1812. The call of blood was so strong he rallied to former enemies rather than see them sacrificed to racial aliens. Men like Tattnall would have taken up arms against their own government if they thought it was giving up their country to non-whites. (Tattnall, in fact, served in the Confederate Navy, but his Yankee former colleagues felt no differently on the central question of race.)

What tortures MacDonald and other thoughtful whites is the question of why we seem to have lost our will to survive as a people. He writes in *Cultural Insurrections* of "implicit" communities of whiteness, such as the Republican party, suburbia, and NASCAR racing fans, but points out that communities for which race is only "implicit" can never defend themselves against the harshly explicit demands of egalitarian multi-racialism. As Sam Francis liked to point out, whites exist objectively as a race; they do not exist subjectively as a race.

Did the environment in which whites evolved really make them uniquely incapable of the ethnocentrism? It may be useful to compare whites with the Chinese and Japanese. North Asians have been marked by the cold even more than whites. The shape of their eyes is thought to protect from sun glinting on snow, and flat noses keep air passages closer to the warmth of the rest of the face.

The behavior of Japanese and Chinese in their homelands nevertheless suggests strong group identification. Japan is famously conformist and strongly discourages immigration. China is not (yet) a desirable destination for immigration so has not had to keep out more than a handful of starving North Koreans, but it is hard to imagine the Chinese frolicking towards oblivion as whites are.

And yet the behavior of Chinese and Japanese outside their own countries is considerably more ambiguous. As MacDonald himself points out, the Chinese in Southeast Asia have established themselves as economic elites, but have not infiltrated government or the cultural apparatus, nor have they tried to undermine Indonesian, Malaysian, or Thai traditions. Economically, they behave like Jews; culturally

¹ Jared Taylor, "The Ways of Our People (Part II)," *American Renaissance*, October, 1996, 4.

they do not behave like them at all.

In the United States, North Asians have been the “model minority”: deferential, assimilationist, and disinclined to make explicitly racial demands. This is likely to change as America loses any trace of coherence, and the benefits of racial agitation become too tempting to pass up. However, it has not been the first impulse of Chinese- or Japanese-Americans to make race-based demands. Although within their homelands their identities seem strong now, can we really be certain that if it had been the Chinese who had played host to Boas, Horkheimer, Adorno, Lenny Bruce, and Steven Spielberg, America might not still be solidly white and China full of Filipinos and Indonesians?

This is not to take anything away from MacDonald’s very stimulating analysis. The question of white capitulation is baffling, and no one has yet offered a satisfactory explanation for why whites have undertaken what seems to be a long march towards extinction. It may be that no explanation will ever be found, even though it is the great, agonizing question of our time and people.

Kevin MacDonald has contributed more to this and related questions than anyone else in our generation. *Cultural Insurrections* is a yet another magnificent gift by him to the men and women of the West.

The author regrets to say that for professional reasons he must remain anonymous. Garnet James Wolseley (1833–1913) was a British army officer who rose to the rank of Field Marshal and was created Viscount Wolseley. He was renowned for his skillful suppression of uprisings and unrest throughout the Empire. In 1862, Wolseley ran the Union blockade and visited the Confederacy, where he met Longstreet, Lee, and Jackson, all of whom he admired. He was the model for Gilbert and Sullivan’s Major-General Stanley, “the very model of a modern Major-General.”